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Pomeranz writes of the "variety of early modern core regions with roughly comparable levels and trends of development in their everyday economies" . 9 More radically still, Goldstone claims that
From 1500-1800 the major states of Europe, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire were all experiencing a similar course of advanced organic development, with absolutist bureaucratic states, highly productive agriculture, a sophisticated urban culture, and extensive long-distance trade in both luxuries and daily necessities… in all of them, the material standard of living c. 1800 was no greater than it had been c. 1500. 10 As laudable as such attempts are downplaying any narrative of European "exceptionality", the theoretical drawbacks are immense, to say nothing of the empirical difficulties of sustaining such arguments. 11 By flattening the myriad social structures making up the early modern world, it becomes very difficult -if not impossible -to explain the striking divergences in their developmental trajectories. 12 The point here is not to reinstate any "European exceptionalist"
explanation, but rather highlight how the interactively-generated differences between Europe and other societies were key to "Western" ascendancy. As examined below, the very "backwardness" of feudal Europe facilitated the propitious conditions from which capitalism could emerge, while this process was structurally conditioned by Europe"s near-constant interaction with more advanced non-Western agents.
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With the initial breakthroughs to capitalism made in the Netherlands and England, this led to increasing material disparities -a widening of the competitive gulf -between these societies and others. 14 Nonetheless, the advent of capitalism in Northwestern Europe did not immediately translate into the kind of hierarchical power relation that characterized the nineteenth century.
While capitalism offered the productive potential for increased technological innovations (including, significantly, within the military sphere) and superior financial and organizational capacities, the developmental effects were not instant or undifferentiated, but staggered, uneven and interactively conditioned by opportunities and pressures emanating from non-Western sources (more below).
An account of the origins of capitalism in Northwestern Europe is in itself not enough to explain the region"s subsequent ascendancy. 15 Rather, capitalism should be conceived as having provided the conditions of possibility for Europe to eventually overcome and dominate their Asian rivals. Bryant is then correct when writing that
The protracted and forcible dominion of the West over the Rest…cannot logically be accounted for on the basis of fundamental similarities between conqueror and conquered, oppressor and oppressed, but must, in the very nature of so inequitable an outcome, register the relational consequences of differences and disparities…as these played out in a coercive contest for land, resources, mastery.
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Without recourse to some form of structural explanation of these diverging paths of development over the longue durée, the revisionists are left to account for the "rise of the West" in terms of pure contingencies and world-historical accidents. In the words of John M. Hobson:
"…the rise of the West could indeed be explained almost wholly through contingency".
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Goldstone in turn describes the conjunctural factors leading to Britain"s transformation into a modern, industrialized state as the "most freakish of accidents". 18 For Pomeranz, the contingent combination of coal and colonies provided Europe with the necessary resources to launch itself into self-sustaining economic growth thereby escaping the labour-intensive path of development. 19 Consequently, "[i]n place of cumulative, path-dependent lines of causality and densely contextual interdependencies", Bryant notes, "the revisionist paradigm offers a more episodic and atomistic view of social change, wherein determinant efficacy is vested not with ongoing trajectories and systemic institutional configurations, but with the autonomous play of variables and the re-routings occasioned by extraneous contingencies". This is then a historical sociological approach that essentially erases the "historical" and "sociological" from the equation as sociohistorical developments are conceived in radically discontinuous terms and sharp breaks, whereby antecedent conditions from which developments usually enfold are entirely displaced. This is not to deny that contingent or fortuitous factors may have aided the process of "catch up" and "overtake" development that occurred in Northwestern
Europe. Nonetheless, something deeper -more structural -was also clearly at work in these processes.
While marking some important advances over conventional Eurocentric explanations of the "rise of the West", the revisionist challenge nonetheless fails to offer a viable alternative. It remains beset by the problems of analytical indeterminacies, empirical shortcomings, and a reliance on a purely conjunctural mode of explanation that foregoes a theorization of the sociohistorical processes at work for the play of free-floating contingencies. In the absence of any alternative theorization, the revisionist approach is unable to fully overturn the prevailing The significance of the concept is primarily three-fold. First, the theory uniquely incorporates a distinctly intersocietal dimension of causality into its most basic conception of development as it reconceives the process as strategically interactive, co-constitutive and thus necessarily multilinear, the outcome of which is always the composite effect of a multiplicity of spatially diverse nonlinear causal chains that combine in any given conjuncture. 26 Those aspects of world-historical development -alterity, mimesis, hybridity, translation, etc. -that revisionist and postcolonial scholars highlight are thus rendered theoretically explicable in substantive historical and sociological terms. Such developmental characteristics are thereby lifted from mere descriptive statements of otherwise arbitrary instantiations of societal differences into active causal factors explaining Western ascendancy. Second, by reformulating "the international" as an "object of social theory -organically contained… within a conception of social development itself" 27 -U&CD allows for the theoretical internalization of contingent, "external" factors and variegated developmental outcomes.
Third, U&CD allows for a holistic account of the "rise of the West" and "decline of the East" as interconnected and mutually constitutive in a way that brings the role of "the international" to the forefront of social-theoretical explanation. This goes some way in breaking out of the analytical stalemate between "internalist" and "externalist" modes of explanations characterizing existing debates. 28 The following offers a schematic exposition of the theory"s two main concepts -unevenness and combination. Developmentally differentiated societies are conceived as constantly impacting upon one another"s development and reproduction instigating various forms of combined development.
Thus while specific spatio-temporal patterns of socio-cultural diversity may be contingent, "the fact of this diversity itself is not". 32 That is, when diverse and differentially situated societies interact -whether through cooperation, conflict or cross-cultural exchange -this "results in particular outcomes that cannot be anticipated in advance and are therefore "contingent"". 33 This international dimension of development thus imbues the historical process with a highly unpredictable, contingent character generating widely diverse effects. As such, the dynamics and modalities of societal differences are not to be visualized as the result of pure essentialisms -an inherent property of a society"s endogenous development -but rather "dependent on a whole web of "necessary but contingent" interactions".
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The indeterminacy of such "contingent" outcomes can therefore be reconceptualized as an intrinsic property of development itself. U&CD thereby provides a theoretical means of explicating the differentiated forms of agency and outcomes emergent from these "necessary but contingent" intersocietal interactions contradicting any pre-determined, linear interpretation of sociohistorical causality and development. In these ways, "contingency" and "necessity" can be divide between "internalist" and "externalist" poles, they do so only formally as neither substantively theorize "the international". 29 brought into a more historically-sensitive theoretical framework that goes beyond contingent and structural-based explanations of the "rise of the West".
Combination refers to the ways in which the internal relations of a society are determined by their relations with other developmentally differentiated societies. This results in the intermingling and fusion of the "foreign" and "native", "advanced" and "backward", within a social formation, whilst simultaneously ontologically blurring the analytical distinctions between such categories. 35 As with unevenness, combination holds a strong empirical referent: multiple societies do not simply exist hermetically side-by-side, but interactively coexist, which by necessity (and with varying degree) determines their collective social and geopolitical development. 36 For example, in Trotsky"s History of the Russian Revolution, we find numerous processes through which the more "backward" Russia attempted to developmentally "catch up"
with a more advanced Western Europe by making use of their pre-existing developmental achievements. The "privilege" of Russia"s backwardness thereby entailed a "skipping" of stages, ensuring attempts at catch up did not follow the same paths of antecedent developments. 37 In the context of debates on the "rise of the West", this is a particularly important point since up until the mid-thirteenth century, it was those social formations that would come to make up "Europe"
that were the least developed in the emerging "world system" of increasing economic integration and cultural contacts between "East" and "West".
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Arising late on the periphery of this world system, European development had the most to gain from the new intersocietal links being forged, particularly through the diffusion of new technologies and "resource portfolios" spreading from "East" to "West". The principles of mathematics, navigational inventions, arts of war, and military technologies all originated in the more advanced "East" before passing to the "backward" West. 39 This enabled European states to acquire the means to revolutionize their own societies in much more intensive concentrations of time than had the original purveyors. Later developing states did not need to start from scratch but could instead acquire and refine the most advanced technologies and organizational forms pioneered by earlier developers. In this respect, European societies benefitted from a "privilege of 35 Cf. By contrast, the earlier and more developed tributary Empires in Asia, enjoyed for a time certain "advantages of progressiveness". However, these advantages would eventually turn into strategic liabilities as less developed societies came to reap the "privilege of backwardness" concomitant to processes of developmental "catch-up". As Andre Gunder Frank writes,
The common global economic expansion since 1400 benefited the Asian centers earlier and more than marginal Europe, Africa, and the Americas. However, this very economic benefit turned into a growing absolute and relative disadvantage for one Asian region after another in the late eighteenth century… Europe and then also North America …were able to take advantage of this pan-Asian crisis in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries…That may have afforded [them] some "advantage of backwardness".
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In this sense, the qualitative unevenness of development, exhibited by the asynchronic simultaneity of an interactive multiplicity of different societies, afforded late-comers particular strategic advantages. This was neither an automatic nor predestined process, but one where both conjunctural and structural factors and agency were key. In what follows, we historically unpack these structural and conjunctural combinations as key components in the "rise of the West". First we examine the structural condition of European feudal crisis before moving on to an exploration of the conjunctural specificity of British colonisation in India.
Structure and Conjuncture in the 'Rise of the West'

Feudalism, Merchants, and the States System in Europe
Thus far we have been emphasizing the need to widen the analysis of the "rise of the West" to conditions and determinations emerging outside of Europe in order to dislodge the familiar Eurocentric claims of some innate European dynamism. There is, however, one specific structural attribute unique to late medieval and early modern European development that 40 Frank, ReOrient, 318, 324. requires further investigation as it does seem to provide some important clues into Europe"s eventual attainment of a comparative advantage in the making of war and production: that is, the decentralized and politically fragmented nature of European feudal relations that gave rise to a fiercely competitive multi-state system. Indeed, the ferociously conflictual character of the European state system has often been cited as a crucial factor in the conventional literature on the "rise of the West", particularly among neo-Weberians holding to a "geopolitical competition model" of development.
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The main problem with such accounts emphasizing interstate competition as the main driver of European developments is the implicit syllogism underlying the model"s causal sequencing: "political multiplicity -anarchy -competition". In other words, the significant socioeconomic and political effects that the neo-Weberians derive from the persistent "whip" of geopolitical competition in spawning technological and organizational innovations in European state-building practices takes for granted precisely what needs to be explained: why was the European states system so competitive and war-prone? The neo-Weberians thereby smuggle in the highly problematic (neo-)realist assumption that any anarchic system of multiple political units will automatically induce geopolitical competition, rivalry, and war, which only works if "we assume the anthropologically questionable idea of man as a natural power-maximizer or a psychologizing rational-choice model, where risk minimization creates an inherent security dilemma". 42 Moreover, by emphasizing the essentially undifferentiated effects of military rivalry on European state formation processes there is a partial convergence between neo-Weberian historical sociology and neorealism over the role of geopolitical competition as a kind of Darwinian selection mechanism sorting out the weak from the strong. 43 Yet European state responses to the universal problem of war facing them in the late medieval and early modern epochs were strikingly different. 44 What we need then is a theory that organically combines both "sociological" and "geopolitical" factors in a unified conception of development. And, again, this is what the theory of U&CD offers as the historically-specific sources, dynamics, and scales of Indeed, the rise of feudalism in Europe was the consequence of the "catastrophic collision of two dissolving anterior [ancient and primitive] modes of production": namely, the "decomposing slave mode of production" on which the Roman Empire had once been constructed, and the "deformed primitive modes of production of the Germanic invaders which survived in their new homelands" after the conquests. 45 The developmental trajectory of Europe"s Germanic forest "tribes"
converged with the remnants of the ancient Roman Empire producing an entirely novel, synthesized form of sedentary society hitherto unknown in human history -feudalism. Moreover, the recombination of the "disintegrated elements" of these two anterior modes of productionthe "Romano-Germanic synthesis"
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-into feudalism proper, was "itself a product of the constant and eventually unbearable pressure of the nomadic Huns on the Germanic world of the Teutonic tribes".
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The genesis of feudalism in European was thus a consequence of these nomadic- One of the primary reasons why geopolitical conflict and war in this period was so persistent in Europe was that the feudal ruling classes were themselves under serious threat. Not only had the feudal system virtually exhausted all possibilities for further internal expansion, but this also precipitated a sharp fall in seigniorial revenues, itself further exacerbated by the plagueinduced demographic crisis spread from the Mongol expansion into Europe, leading to a dramatic rise in peasant revolts and class conflicts more generally. 71 This perilous situation was continually exacerbated and "overdetermined" by the persistent geopolitical-ideological threat emanating from the Ottoman Empire. 72 Under such conditions, a near continuous state of war -including both intra-ruling class struggles and the incessant efforts to crush peasant rebellions -was a sociological "necessity". And since European states "did not have the resources of an agrarian empire in cheap manpower" they were unable "to substitute "quantity for quality"". 73 By the early modern period, this led to an unprecedented dynamism in the military sector which "could maintain productivity growth for centuries, a feat virtually unknown elsewhere in pre-industrial economies". 74 The rapid growth in Europe"s military sectors was perhaps a key reason, along with the development of stronger fiscal and organizational capacities, 75 for Europe"s later successes in overseas conquests. In these ways, the overall conditions of uneven and combined development emanating from both within and without Europe created the propitious "geo-social" environment in which specific countries, notably the Dutch and English, could emerge and consolidate themselves as capitalist states. 76 Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Mughal Empire was by contrast considerably weakened by the incessant interstate wars in Asia, along with insurgency and piracy within their realm and the coast. The Mughals had to contend with both the "conventional threat"
posed by the invading armies of Durrani Empire from Afghanistan and the "unconventional warfare launched by the Marathas". 77 While Britain had by the mid-seventeenth century come to attain a slight advantage in fiscal-military capabilities vis-à-vis the Mughal Empire, their ability to colonize the Indian landmass was appreciably aided by these external pressures and internal divisions ravaging the Empire. The Mughals were particularly vulnerable to a European intervention at that time since the various contending regional rulers were unwilling or unable to These points go some way in turning on its head typical Eurocentric conceptions of the more "backward" and "stagnant" imperial empires of Asia, since it was the less developed nature of
European feudal societies -their very reproductive weaknesses -that made them more susceptible to potential capitalist breakthroughs. 79 However, in order to fully subvert Eurocentric accounts of the "rise of the West", we must move beyond a simple comparative historical sociological analysis of the differences between the feudal and tributary systems, and examine how their interactive developmental dynamics produced the structural and conjunctural conditions Europe forming a crucial step in the formation of the modern territorially-defined states system. 83 These territorial sovereign states were subsequently taken over and reconstituted by the capitalist revolutions in Holland, England and France that stretched from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 84 Finally, through the colonial activities of merchant companies (specifically, the Dutch and English East India Companies) and slave traders, communities across both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean littoral were incorporated into an integrated system of exploitation and extraction.
In these ways, the value appropriated from a globally dispersed mass of labour-power constituted a key input for the formation and reproduction of European capital. 85 Europe"s "unique" developmental trajectory out of feudalism and into capitalism -assisting its rise to global preeminence -was therefore rooted in and conditioned by extra-European determinations and agents. It was the combination of these multiple spatio-temporal vectors of development -many of which non-European in origin -that explains the so-called European "miracle".
These conditions of uneven and combined development emanating from both within and without Europe created a favourable "geo-social" environment in which specific countries could emerge and consolidate themselves as capitalist states: territorialized sovereign centres of capital accumulation. 86 As we have seen, the methods and means of "geo-social" reproduction in Europe and Asia were strikingly different, producing divergent forms and trajectories of geopolitical accumulation which, over the course of Europe"s early modern development, came to interact and fuse with the emerging logic of capital accumulation accompanying those states making the To put all of this in more theoretical terms, we can see how "unevenness", in terms of both the divergent development between a feudal-cum-capitalist "West" and tributary "East" and the differential forms of their respective geopolitical systems, and "combination", operating at the level of geopolitical interactions and competition facilitating military and organizational innovations, were crucial explanatory factors in the "rise of the West". While neo-Weberians" are correct to single out geopolitical competition as significant, their inability to root this factor in a strong conception of social structures -and examine the differential forms and effects of military competition -leaves them into the well-worn (neo)realist cul-de-sac of ahistorical reification and unit homogenization (the "state-qua-state" assumption). By contrast, the theory of U&CD solves both these problems: it offers a theoretical explanation of geopolitical competition and its effects that remains sensitive to substantive societal differences whilst incorporating a distinctly "geopolitical" causal component into its conception of development thereby eliding the problem 87 Hoffman, "Prices", 39. 88 Britain"s colonization of India has been underappreciated in "rise of the West" debates, 90 which have largely centred around the origins of industrialization in Europe and, in particular, the question of why Britain was first to industrialize. Conceived as such, the prior history of British colonization is relegated to a secondary status in explaining the "rise of the West", if it is examined at all. Yet not only was Mughal India the first of the great tributary empires in Asia to "fall" to the Europeans, but it also provided the greatest material and strategic benefits of all the colonized states. For not only did India offer Britain the material inputs (notably, textiles and cotton) and capital crucial to the start of its industrialization drive but, after its colonization, it also provided the Empire with a relatively cheap and sizeable military force that assisted the British in forcibly opening other markets around the world.
Thus even the more restrictive question as to the causes of Britain"s industrialization within the debates have been both temporally and spatially misplaced. Temporally so, in the sense that in order to explain Britain"s industrial ascent we must first look at the preceding epoch of British colonialism in both the Atlantic and India which, in turn, means that our spatial optic must be widened to include an analysis of these extra-European regions" contributions to Britain"s industrialization. 91 Indeed, the Indian economy was absolutely critical to the "formation and consolidation of a UK-centred system of accumulation", particularly through India"s role in providing a continual balance-of-payments surplus for the Empire. 92 Britain earned huge annual surpluses from the Empire"s transactions with India (and through it, China) that allowed Britain to sustain substantial deficits with the US, Germany and its" white Dominion states as "the large organizational scale and sophistication, the revenue system would over time develop a number of problems that came to hinder the overall functioning of the Mughal economy: particularly, the tendency to over-exploit the peasantry.
Since the time of Akbar (1568), a practice was established whereby jāgīrdārs, who held no permanent rights to the land, were transferred to new territorial assignments every three to four years. This kept in check any tendency for them to develop into feudal-like lords. However, it also had a number of unintentional negative consequences, increasing over time, for the agrarian economy. For as the jāgīrdārs were being continually transferred to different territorial assignment every few years, their short-term interest was not necessarily in increasing or even maintaining agricultural growth and productivity, but rather in maximizing the exploitation of the peasantry in their assigned territorial domain thereby subverting the long-term objectives of the imperial authority. As Habib explains,
…there was an element of contradiction between interests of the imperial administration and the individual jāgīrdārs. A jāgīrdār, whose assignment was liable to be transferred any moment and who never held the same jāgīr for more than three of four years at the most, could have no interest in following a far-sighted policy of agricultural development… his personal interest would sanction any act of oppression that conferred an immediate benefit upon him, even if it ruined the peasantry and so destroyed the revenue-paying capacity of that area for a long time. 118 Inherent to the Mughal revenue system was then a tendency towards the absolute "maximization of exploitation" to the point of destabilizing the entire agrarian economy. 119 Moreover, as military contingents were maintained by the mansabdārs out of the revenues of the jāgīrs, the imperial authorities tended to set revenue demand at a high enough level to secure the greatest amount of European ships if and when they so desired. 131 On land, a large and sophisticated network of fortresses formed the backbone of Maratha military might. 132 Both land and sea capabilities were often mobilised in response to European penetration into the region. On the other hand, the Marathas sought to reap the "privileges of backwardness" in any areas in which Europeans held a comparative advantage -namely, the use of firearms and modern military strategy.
From the Portuguese and French came the main supplies of firearms -gunpowder, cannon balls, and lead were all purchased and entered use in the Maratha army. 133 Such was the integration of the Euro-Maratha military-commercial complex that the Marathas allowed the French to build a factory at Rajapore in 1679 and "employed Portuguese agents to purchase artillery from them". 134 But the integration of Europeans extended beyond exchange in military goods.
As early as 1692, the French Governor Martine was providing tactical assistance to the Meanwhile, the increasing Dutch and English penetration into Asian markets over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries caused serious disturbances in the Mughal economy and intensified the financial difficulties of the ruling classes. As the costs of luxury goods consumed by the ruling classes increased with their diversion from their "traditional"
